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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEXXECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TIOX, a corporation, and BING-
HAM AND GARFIELD RAIL-
\VAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaifnti[fs, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COM~1:ISSION, 
Defend1ant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7298 
The parties hereto have cooperated below in endea-
voring to shape an inherent'ly complicated tax record 
in such manner that there could be presented concisely 
for the determination of this court six questions of prin-
ciple. The mathematical results to follow when these 
principles are determined may then be worked out with-
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out, it is expected, subjecting the court to such details. 
·Therefore the facts herein are stipulated in an ''Agreed 
Record'' (R. 101-113) amplified by a brief formal hear-
ing before the Commission. (R. 39-100.) 
A. As To The Parties 
1. The Commission is a body politic created and 
existing in accordance with the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and authorized by law to administer Chapter 
13 of Title 80 of the Utah Code, known as the Corpora-
tion Franchise ~eax Act. 
2 (a). Kennecott Copper Corporation is a corpora-
tion of the State of New York duly quaHfied to do and 
doing business there as well as in Utah and other states. 
It owns and operates the well-known Utah Copper Mine 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Its ores from this 
mine are then transporit:ed to its mills at Magna and 
Arthur. This transportation at the time here involved 
was over the tracks of the Bingham and Garfield Railway 
Company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary. ('The 
Utah Corporation Franchise Tax returns of that com.-
pany are consolidated with Kennecott's and for all pur-
poses herein this transportation operation wrll be in-
cluded as part of the Utah Copper Division operations 
of Kennecott.) 
(b). The n1ill concentrates of Kennecott are smelted 
at Garfield and o<ther smelters in Utah and elsewhere 
under contract arrangements with the American Smelting 
and Refining Company and other smelting companies. 
Blister copper, the product of the sm·elting, is then trans-
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ported by Kenneeot t through the service of various cmn-
mon ean·ier~ to refineriPs, all of which are outside of 
the ~tate of Utah. Kennecott has no interest in any of 
these coBmwn carrier~ or in any of the smelting and 
refining emnpanies. 
(c). The refined product is then sold for Kenne-
eott':s account by Kennecott Sales Corporation, which is 
a whoUy owned subsidiary and which receives an agreed 
eommission for such services. Part of Kennecott's cop-
per precipitates is neither smelted nor refined, but is 
~old by Kennecott as produced. (At all times until sale, 
the ores from the Utah Copper J\fine remain Kennecott's 
despite ehanges due to milling, smelting and refining.) 
(d). In the course of Kennecott's operations it en-
gages the service of and pays a substantial number of 
employees in Utah and in the other s~tates in which it is 
engaged in business. Kennecott purchases great quanti-
ties of equipment, materials and supplies both within and 
outside the State of Utah for necessary use and con-
sumption in the course of its operations. (R. 101-3; 'Stip. 
par. I.) 
B. As To The Deficiency Assessment. 
1. Kennecott and the Commission were once before 
engaged in controversy with respect to the two main 
issues here, namely, the method of al~ocating a proper 
proportion of Kennecott's inconie to the Btate of Utah, 
and the method of computing the deduction to be allowed 
for depletion of its mining properties under the Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act. The taxable years involved were 
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1935 to 1941 inclusive. VVhile this controversy was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Case No. 
6324, a mutually satisfactory settlement was agreed upon 
and by stipulation the proceedings were dismissed under 
date of May 27, 1942. 
2. Under the terms of this settlement certain prin-
ciples for computing Kennecott's franchise tax liability 
were mutually agreed upon and applied to each of the 
years 1935 to 1941 inclusive. The corporation franchise 
tax returns filed by Kennecott for the calendar years 
1942, 1943 and 1944 were likewise prepared and filed in 
exact conformance wi~th such principles; and in accor-
dance therewith the tax was computed, levied and paid 
for each such year and for the taxable year 1942 in the 
sum of $17 4,100.54. 
3. Notwithstanding the foregoing settlement and 
the further fact that there were no changes in the per-
sonnel of the Commission, by letter dated March 10, 1945 
the Commission proposed adjustments in the tax and 
assessed a deficiency or additiona1 tax for the year 1942 
in the sum of $232,722.66. Kennecott objected to said 
deficiency by petition for redetermination timely filed, 
claiming a refund of the tax paid. (R. 103-4; Stip. par. 
II.) 
C. Kennecott's Two Requests 
Among other matters, the May, 1942 agreement in-
volved the following: 
(a). The taxpayer was to file, not for its entire 
operations, but on the basis of its Utah Copper Division 
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ineome alone; and it was to allocate to Utah a proportion 
of that inc01ne on the basis of certain variable but agreed 
factors. (T. 109-10; :S:tip. par. IY.) 
(b). In con1puting the allowance for depletion, fed-
eral taxes were not first deducted. (T. 108-9; Stip. par. 
III (B).) 
(c). Fina:lly, in cmnputing the depletion allowance, 
all Utah ~lines Division net incom·e. resulting from pro-
duetion of metals was treated as ''net income from the 
property." (R.. 105-8; Stip. par. III (A).) 
(Parenthetically it may here be noted that the princi-
ples under this agreement were a logical and reasonable 
development of the transition of the old Utah Copper 
Company into the Kennecott Copper Corporation with 
its manifold operations in addition to those in Utah. 
Kennecott does not contend that the agreement was 1eg-
ally binding on the Commission as to the returns sub-
sequent to 1941.) 
Subsequently the Commission chose, by its deficiency 
assessment made herein, to depart from the principles 
of the 1fay 1942 agreement; whereupon Kenneco1tt in 
turn, in connection with its petition for redetermination 
and the hearing thereon, contended that it, too, had such 
a right and made the following two requests or conten-
tions: 
-- First: That Utah's statutes require in the abs·ence 
of agreement or a determination under subsection 8 of 
< Section 80-13-21, that the ~tax be based upon a return re-
"i'; porting the corporation's over-all operations, and then 
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invoking the statutory allocation formula to determine 
the taxable 1Jtah income. ( R. 110; Btip. par. IV (3).) 
Since agreement seemed no longer possible in view of 
the Commission's change of attitude, on January 19, 
1948 Kennecott filed its Amended Return on the corpor-
ate basis as required by Section 80-13-21 (1-7). (R. 110, 
228-34.) 
Second: That it be permitted to change to the Utah 
cost-or-value method of determining depletion (Section 
80-13-9 (a) ) , or in the alternative preferably to the fed-
eral percentage method, since the state percentage me-
thod as then interpreted and applied by the Commission 
resulted in a denial of the required reasonable allowance 
for depletion. (R. 105; Stip. par. III.) The reasons 
g·iven for this request were detailed in the testimony at 
the formal hearing and will be summarized hereafter in 
connection with the argument on this point. 
Kennecott also raised other points now moot because 
conceded by the Commission, attacked the Franchise Act 
as the Connnission would here apply it as unconstitu-
tional, and objected to the inclusion of federal subsidies 
as gross income. (R. 131-147.) 
D. The Commission's Decision 
The Commission's decision is silent with respect to 
some of these matters, but it is not in dispute that by its 
decision and the accommpanying schedules (R. 16-36): 
First: The agreement of May, 1942 was still invoked 
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to th(_} t>xtent that tlte tax wa8 still computed on the agree-
ment basis. and not on the basis of Kennecott's run ended 
return covering ih~ entir~ operations and then allocating 
ineome to Utah. 
Second: The agreement of May, 1942 was not fol-
!O'lred in at least three respects: 
(a). .--\.n allocation of total income to ''mining'' 
has now been n1ade by a Commission-devised seH-proving 
formula, thus eliminating such excluded part of the to1tal 
income fron1 the property in computing depletion. (Ex. 
±, R. 226.) 
(b). In computing depletion federal taxes have now 
first been deducted. 
(c). \Yhile treating the Utah Copper Division as a 
separate tax unit for some purposes, the Commission on 
the other hand now uses Kennecott's entire operations 
in other respects, such as for the allocation of federal· 
taxes to Utah. 
Third: 'The position of the plaintiff that if the Com-
mission were to depart from the May, 1942 agreement, 
Kennecott, too, would be freed therefrom, and its two 
requests above outlined would therefore be proper, was 
completely ignored. 
E. Payment and Review 
\Yithin the time allowed by law plaintiff deposited 
with the defendant the amount found by it to he due, and 
applied for and obtained from this court the statutory 
~: writ of review. (R. 3-14.) 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Tax Commission erred in refusing to follow 
the Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act ( §80-13-21) 
which in the case of a taxpayer doing business in several 
states requires that the tax shall be based upon a return 
including the company's operations in those staJtes and 
then allocating to Utah its proportion of that total income 
in accordance with the statutory formula. 
2. The State Tax Commission erred in that it has 
fai1led to allow the taxpayer the required reasona:ble 
allowance for depletion. 
3. The Commission has misinterpreted the Utah 
statutes establishing the percentage formula for deter-
mining depletion. 
4. The Tax Commission erred in that it has dis-
criminated against this taJrpayer and is attempting to 
take its property without due process of law in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, and Sections 7 and 24, Article I, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the 
tax base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the F,ederal Gov-
ernment. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Tax Oommi:ssion erred in refusing to follow the 
Utah Oorporation Franchise Tax Act (§80-13-21) which 
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in the case of a t.:1.xpayer doing business in several states 
requires that the tax shall be based upon a return indu.ding 
the company's operations in those states and then albcati:ng 
to Utah its proportion of that· total incom~e in acoordance 
with the statutory formula. 
This question is the fan1iliar one of how a fair pro-
portion of the income of the multi-state corporation shaH 
be assigned or allocated for tax purposes to any particu-
lar state. Utah has met the question with the statutory 
mandate of § 80-13-21 which requires reporting of the 
taxpayer's total income, and then after segregating and 
providing for the treatment of rents, interest, dividends 
and capital gains, provides: 
( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries 
on any business outside this state, the said re-
mainder may be divided into three equal parts: 
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be at-
tributed to business carried on with this state as 
shall be found by muUiplying said ~third by a 
fraction whose numerator is the value of the cor-
poration's tangible property situated within this 
state and whose denominator is the value of all 
the corporation's tangible property wherever 
situated. 
(b) Of another third, such portion shall be 
attributed to business carried on within this state 
as shall be found by multiplying said third by a 
fraction whose numerator is the total amount 
expended by the corporrution for wages, salaries, 
commissions or other compensation to its employ-
ees and assignable to this state and whose de-
nominator is the total expenditures of the cor-
poration for wages, salaries, commissions or other 
compensation to all of its employees. 
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(c) Of 'the rema1nrng third, such portion 
shall be attributed to business carried on within 
this state as shall be found by multiplying said 
third 1by a fraction whose numerator is the amount 
of the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to this sta:te, and whose denominator 
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts 
from all its business. 
Subsection (8) then provides: 
(8) If in the judgment of the tax. commis-
sion the application of the foregoing ru1es does 
not allocate to this S'tate the proportion of net 
income fairly and equitably attributable to this 
state, it may with such information as it may be 
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairlv 
calculated ·to assign to this state the portion o.f 
net income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state and to avoid subjecting 
the taxpayer to double taxation. 
As heretofore noted, the taxpayer and the Com-
mission through 1941 by agreement had invoked an alter-
native 1nethod to the standard three-part" :Massachusetts 
formula." Now, can the Comn1ission ex-parte change 
those agreed principles and without further ado substi-
tute its own new allocation rnethod; or is not such action 
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law unless and until 
subsection ( 8) is properly invoked~ 
The Comrnission once before tried just this2 and in 
1939 was to'ld by this court that the legislature intended 
the Commission to depart from the formula only when-
ever the application if its provisions does not allocate to 
the state the business fairly attributable to it. California 
10 
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Packing Corporation Y. State Tax Commission, 97 Utah 
367, 93 P. 2d -!63. 
Amplifying this staten1ent, J-ustices Wolfe and :Mc-
Donough noted: 
• * • In detennining the ''portion of net 
incon1e as~ignable to business done within this 
state'· the commission "may" use the rules set 
out in the main opinion. This does not mean that 
the Commission may ignore the rules and choose 
its 0"\Yn. '' nlay •' has the meaning of "should," 
i.e., should follow the rules unless ·the rules. fail 
to accomplish the overarching purpose as revealed 
by subsection (8). It is only in cas·e an appli-
cation of the rules as laid down fails to "aUocate 
to this state the proportion of net income fairly 
and equitably attributable •to this state'' (sub-
section 8), or, on the other hand, where the rules 
would subject the taxpayer to so-called double 
taxation that the Commission may depart from 
them. This conclusion is fortified by 1the fact 
that the word "may" is used, together with the 
fact that the entire purpose of the rule is to arrive 
at a figure "fairly calculated to assign to this 
state the portion of the net income reasonab~y 
attributable to the business done within the state 
and to avoid subjeeting the taxpayer to double 
taxation." * * * (p. 380) 
Also: 
* * * If a corporation had much property 
here as compared to its total property, but did 
little business here, it would on the first third 
of its total net income from sales, under sub-
section (6) (a), pay a disproportionate tax, but 
this might he compensated for under subsection 
( 6) (c), depending on how subsection ( 6) (e) (1st) 
is interpreted. Usually the proportions of its 
11 
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total wages and salaries attributable to Utah, cal-
culated under subsection ( 6) (b), related to the 
tota!l wages and salaries paid everywhere would 
represent a fair proportion of net income allocable 
to Utah, compared to total net income from all 
sales. And frequently the inequities which might 
ensue from the use of just one of the fractions 
defined by subsection (G) (a), (b) and (c), would 
be compensated by the use of the three fractions 
each based on a third of the total net income 
(excluding that set out in subsections (3) and ( 4). 
But here and there by the use of all these frac-
tions a marked inequity might still remain either 
against the state or against the taxpayer, in which 
case subsection (8) comes into play. (p. 384.) 
In that case in applying the law the court held that 
the taxpayer was ''the usual and ordinary manufacturing 
company and there is shown no reason for departing 
fron1 the regular method of computation to determine 
the amount of its franchise tax." So, here, the taxpayer 
is the usual and ordinary mining company; it has prop-
erty in Utah and elsewhere; has employees here and else-
·where; and rnakes sales here and elsewhere. 
The record is silent as to why the Commission ig-
nored Kennecott's return, which after this controversy., 
arose \vas based upon the statutory formula. It is ap-
parent that the formula gives a less favorable result in 
total tax dollars due insofar as the State of Utah is con-
cerned; but this court in its opinions has never sanctioned 
this end as justification for departure from ~egislative 
mandate. We would venture that the individual members 
of the Commission have never even looked at Exhibit 
1 (R. 219-223), which was explained by the witness Par-
12 
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spn::-: at pggp 51 of the record. On cross exmnination the 
Commission'~ counsel fluffed off the matter by suggesting 
that Kennecott had not first obtained "pern1ission to 
change"; and ~lr. Parsons ad1nitted that he knew of no 
such request. (R. 3~)) However, to the extent such a re-
quest "·as necessary (we believe it not) counsel for plain-
tiff then made it clear that Kennecott did so submit such 
a request to the Comn1ission. ( R. 53) Furthermore this 
fact was apparent to any who had bothered to read Ken-
necott's letter of January 19, 1948 which accompanied the 
filing with the Commission of the amended return based 
upon the statutory forn1ula. (Augmented Record, pp. 
228-34.) 
But without further ado the statute and return pur-
suant thereto were ignored by the Commission, which 
apparently by its decision in the main merely rubber-
stamped the ingenious staff attempts designed to gain 
more revenue. In doing this the Commission acted re-
gardless of the fact that the staff report disregarded 
prior commitments by the Commission, its own admini-
stratiye practice over the years, and the statutes of the 
State of Utah as construed by this court. 
2. The State Tax Commission erred in that it has 
failed to allow the taxpayer the required reasonable allow-
ance for depletion. 
a. Legislati~e History of Depletion. 
An elementary principle peculiar to operations such 
as mining is that ore in place is a wasting asset. Like 
money in the bank, there is only so much; and when with-
drawn pro tanto it is gone. Hence returns from mining 
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are ''income'' only to the extent that excluded from the 
gross is a proper allowance for depletion, and hence 
under both state and federal statutes based upon income 
there is afforded a deduction for depletion. 27 Am. Jur., 
"Income Taxes," §§ 122-125. 
In New Park Mining Company, et al v. State Tax 
Cmmnission, 196 P. 2d 485, this court said: 
'' * * * The theory upon which wasting assets 
corporations, such as mining companies, are 
aUowed a deduction for depletion, is that the cor-
poration franchise tax is a tax on income or upon 
the increment produced by capital, and not upon 
the capital itself. Hence, wasting assets corpor-
ations are allowed a deduetion for depletion on 
the theory that the taxpayer thus recoups its 
capital investment. * * *" 
The statutory wording requires the deduction of • 'a 
reasonable allowance for depletion *'»* .according to the 
peculiar conditions in each case ; such reasonable allow-
ance in all cases to be made under rules and regulations 
to be prescribed by the tax commission." ( § 80-13-8(8), 
Utah Code Annotated 1943.) 
(Parenthetically, it should here be noted that the 
Cmnmission contends in effect that these words in the 
Inain are Ineaningless, since the taxpayer can utilize but 
two possible methods of dep'letion computation.) 
This principle being clear, its administration be-
comes complicated only in the determination of what is 
the proper base for depletion ''in each case.'' If exces-
sive, the operator will not be paying his full income tax; 
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if deficient, the ta..'\:ing authority will be atten1pting im-
properly to collect taxes based other than on incon1e. It 
~lwuld be noted that in contrast w·ith the Federa!l Govern-
ment, the State Tax Conunission has n1ade no general 
rule~ and regulations covefing depletion. (R. 104) 
At first Congress established as the base for com-
puting depletion the value of the particular mine (or its 
eost where that exceeded value) as of the effective date 
of the income tax laws, or its cost (today discovery value) 
at the tin1e of acquisition if such occured subsequent 
thereto. This Inethod was likewise adopted by ,the Utah 
Leg·islature in 1931 ( § 80-13-8 (9a) ), and is still the 
method prescribed by both state and federa1l governments 
for determining capital loses or gains in the event of sale 
of the mining property. (§§ 80-13-8 (9a), 80-13-14; Wit-
nes~ Earl, R. 59-60, 71-2.) 
But mining ventures are both speculative and their 
Yalue is often extremely difficult to determine as of any 
giyen date such as January 1, 1931. (R. 218) :So Con-
gress, after extensive studies of the problem, devised an 
alternative second method-15% of the gross proceeds, 
but not to exceed 50% of the net; and presently the tax-
payer is permitted to make a choice each year of either 
method. (R. 73-4) This percentage method is not just an 
arbitrary allowance, but was adopted by Congress as 
fair to both the Government and the taxpayer. Based 
upon extensive studies and hearings, the precise percent-
age adopted was directly related to typical actuaHy ascer-
tained values. (R. 73-4) These studies indicated that the 
metal mining industry received in depletion allowances 
based upon cost-or-value an average deduction equiva-
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lent to about 17% of their gross sales, reported the Joint 
Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
p. G8, Vol. I, Par·t 8, submitted to Congress September 
19, 1929. 'The Committee therefore recommended: 
''From the study of this subject it is believed 
that 15 per cent of the gross sales value with a 
50 per cent limitation to net income, 'vould be a 
reasonable rate to allow the metal-mining industry 
for the future. This reduction by 2 per cent of 
the actual figures shown in the summary is 
thought advisable to offset the continuing effect 
of the percentage depletion method. 
''The 15 per cent depletion allowance on 
gross sales is equivalent to a th~oretical deduc-
tion of 30 per cent on net income. In actual 
operations the 30 per cent on net may vary 15 
per cent above or below this figure, depending on 
the profits made by the particular operation.'' 
As the United States was amending its laws to carry 
into effect these committee recommendations, Utah in 
1931 was adopting its own state corporation franchise 
tax as the result of the Professor Lutz tax studies under 
the Dern administration. A percentage method was like-
wise included as an alternative to value by § 80-13-8 (9) 
(b), but was set at 33 1-3 per cent of the ·•net income 
from the property *** computed without allowance for 
depletion. '' After once making an election of method, 
however, the taxpayer cannot subsequently change with-
out the Tax Commission's consent. 
b. History in K·enneoott's Case. 
Kennecott (we include its predecessor) in 1931 made 
the election required by the new Utah statute. It accepted 
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the percentage method which it has consistently followed 
until tl1e instant controversy. (R. 104) When in 1932 
Kennecott, as well as other Utah mines, e1lected to invoke 
the state percentage n1ethod, it is important to note that 
the Tax Comn1ission 's initial return fonns permitted, 
and those concerned invariably interpreted the statute 
to provide for: ( 1) no allocation of income fron1 the 
mining property to "n1ining"; and (2), no prior deduc-
tion of federal taxes. (R. 106, 62). Kennecott, as well 
as others, filed its returns on this basis and these returns 
were acc~·pted by the Commission from 1931 and for 
many years sttbsequent thereto. (R. 108) 
In 1943, however, when the federal tax had become 
a most substantial factor, the Commission reviewed its 
practice; determined that the terms of the statutes re-
quired federal taxes to be first deducted before conlput-
ing depletion if the percentage method were to be in-
Yoked; amended its return forms to so provide ( Stip. 
III (B), R. 108); and successfully sustained this position 
in 1948 in the New Park ~fining Company et aJ. cases 
supra. (R. 109) The court in that opinion, however, 
noted that the taxpayers there had elected to compute 
depletion under the percentage method; and the brief of 
the Commission in those cases constantly reiterated that 
the plaintiffs had not sought permission to change to a 
method other than Utah's percentage formula. In this 
connection, on March 14, 1944 the Commission had writ-
ten: 
''Please be advised that the Tax Commis-
sion has denied the request of the Utah Mining 
Congress for a change in the method of comput-
17 
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ing depletion. The Commission feels that the 
law makes it manda1tory to deduct federal taxes 
before computing depletion. 
''However, the Commission would be very 
sympathetic to a request for a change from the 
percentage depletion method to the cost method 
in determining depletion.'' 
(Ex. 5; R. 227.) 
In the case now before the court Kennecott sought 
to 1nake just such a change. (Ex. 3; R. 225.) But the 
effect of the decision was to deny that request. No reason 
is assigned for this action, which plaintiff attacks as 
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. 
This request was in the nature of a third choice or 
preference, since the taxpayer primarily requested and 
still suggests as the fair·est and most practical method 
the use of the Federal percentage method, to be available 
of course to all mines. Mr. Earl described the history 
and advantages in detail of that method and recom-
mended that it be followed by the Commission. (R. 77) 
But the Commission apparently is of the opinion that l\Ir. 
Earl's remarks and Kennecott's request in this respect 
should be addressed to the legislature; i.e., in Utah, 
depletion under the law as it stands must be based upon 
one of only two alternatives. (R. 87) 
Thus, also, the point is here presented as to whether 
or not this restrictive construction is correct. If it is, 
the words ''according to the peculiar conditions in each 
case" are use1less, as also is the standard of "a reason-
able allowance'' applied to the facts of this. case. 
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The defendant by its decision reduced still further 
the proposed allowance of $6,455,813.78 and determined 
that the allowance for depletion in this case should be 
$6,089,670.26 (Schedule 8, R. 27), the gross Utah Copper 
Division income for that year being $85,513,885.12. ( Sche-
dule 11, R. 31.) This figure is roughly 50 per cent of the 
allowance computed under any of the following recog-
nized rnethods for determining a ''reasonable allow-
ance'': 
No. 1-Federal value method ____________ $12,438,135.57 
X o. 2-Federal percentage method .. $10,650,822.81 
No. 3-Utah value method ________________ $14,007,442.00 
No. -±-Utah percentage method 
(before Commission's 
changes in interpretation) .. $12,822,347.09 
(Utah as allowed __________________ $6,089,670.26) 
(Ex. 3; R. 255.) 
The witness Geo. C. Earl, plaintiff's Chief Engineer, 
is a man of extensive training and practical experience. 
He is intirnately familiar with mining pro'Perties and 
particularly the mine in question, and an expert in the 
field of mine valuation. (R. 57, et seq.) Neither his 
qualifications nor the engineering determinations of 
value (or for that matter the percentage calculations) are 
in dispute. He expressed the opinion that any of the 
above four methods applied to the peculiar circumstances 
of this case would afford a reasonable allowance for 
depletion within the permissive limits of administrative 
judgment (R. 74); that a variation in the application of 
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these n1ethods of from ten to fourteen million dollars 
was within the limits of judgment (R. 75); but that the 
dilninu tion of the depletion a'llowance to the six million 
dollar figure used by the Commission, or less than fifty 
·per cent, was "wholly unreasonable" and had "abso-
lutely no relationship" to the actual operations and a 
fair allowance. (R. 76.) 
Q. Now, Mr. Earl, do you recognize that a 
variation between some of these methods from 
Ten Million to Fourteen MiUion is within the limi-
tations of judgmenU This is correct, isn't iO 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. But with the diminution of that allowance 
to Six Million or less than 50% is, in your opinion, 
unreasonable~ 
A. Wholly unreasonable. 
Q. And has no relationship to the fact of the 
actual operation out there as you know it to be~ 
A. It has absolutely no relationship. 
(Tr. 37-8.) 
Plaintiff's position accordingly is that this record 
shows an arbitrary and capricious attitude on the part 
of the Commission, resulting in denial to plaintiff of the 
required statutory deduction of a reasonable allowance 
for depletion. The commission should have granted the 
request of Kennecott to compute the allowance ·either and 
preferably on the federal percentage basis, or on the 
Utah value-of-January 1, 1931 method under the circum-
stances. It is, we submit, evident that the Commission's 
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staff's objective was to apply mathematics and to inter-
pret the law to produce the lowest possib1le result in dol-
lars assignable to this deduction, rather than to allow a 
reasonable amount. (R. ~)2) 
C~IR ~-\.LLISON) : 
~-\.. I don't feel in a position to express an 
opinion as to the reasona}bleness of this or any 
other depletion allowance. In our determination 
\Ye have attempted to apply the statutory require-
ments for the depletion allowance, and we haven't, 
as ~-\.uditors, concerned ourse;lves with the reason-
ableness of the result obtained. 
As will be noted from the rather brief record herein, 
the answer to these charges is largely silence. However, 
there did occur staff attempts to justify their action in 
that it \vas shown that from 1931 through 1941 the Com-
mision had allowed $52,240,744.01 in depletion (R. 94) on 
the taxpayer's own 1931 base of but $11,419,540.00. (R. 
83, 9'5) The latter was a hearsay figure at the time it 
was first utilized, confusing Commissioner Hammond, 
who said (R. 84): "How can you say that for one year 
the six million dollar charge for depiletion is unreasonable 
when that is more than half the amount of the fair value 
of the property as reported by the Company***~" 
Mr. Earl replied (R. 84-5): 
The figure to which you refer, Mr. Hammond, 
I am not at all familiar with it. I do not know 
the basis upon which it was reported, or anything 
else, and I cannot answer that question, but I do 
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know this, that the basis set out in your statute 
is the fair market value of that mine as of that 
date. There (that) would be hundreds of millions 
of doHars, and that is what we are concerned with 
on depletion, regardless of any other figures. 
Your statute says it shall be the fair market value 
of the property as of that date. Now, the rules for 
detennining the fair market value of a mine have 
long been established. They hav·e been recognized 
by the government, by purchasers of property, 
and people who have properties for sale. And the 
only thing about it, it is not subject to an exact 
determination because judgment has to enter into 
the factors used. Now, I say I don't know what 
that figure (the hearsay figure) is; I don't know 
the basis for reporting it. Investment and market 
value as of a date have no relationship whatever. 
COM. HAMMOND: It just occured to me it 
was necessary to have some explanation ·of that 
great discrepancy in view of the fact that I think 
we generally agree that the purpose of allowing 
a deduction from a gross in arriving at the net 
income of a mine is to look for the return of 
capital, and that here, this report seems to have 
two figures; One of them Eleven Million Dollars 
plus as a fair value of the mine, and another fig-
ure, Eight Million Dollars plus as the book value 
of the mine. Now, those figures as I understand 
it haven't yet been presented here, and I don't 
know just how sound the basis is upon which I 
am making that inquiry, but the figures seem to 
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be so far apart it seems to rne yon could make 
sonu? explanation that would in s01ne way justify 
your conclusions that the Six l\iillion Dollar figure 
wasn't reasonable. 
The next day (reporter not present) it developed 
that the figure in doubt was based upon the net proceeds 
mine Yaluation for the depression year in question (Ex. 
6, Schedule "'H", Items (1 and 6, R. 217); and thus, as 
stated by 1Ir. Earl, it was without re1lationship to the 
different statutory basis for depletion to be allowed for 
income tax purposes. 
Here we can only speculate as to what was the true 
basis for the decision in this case which without explana-
tion sustained the depletion but at a figure reduced even 
below that made before the hearing. It is appreciated 
keenly that in this instance the latitude of the Comrnis-
sion is extensive, and that the burden is upon Kennecott 
to pursuade this court that the action taken was an abuse 
of discretion. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 114 F. 2d 882. 
But not only is the record barren of anything Inate-
rial and relevant other than Mr. Earl's undisputed testi-
mony that the allowance was below the limits of judg-
ment; affirmatively it is shown that the amount allowed 
is only about 50% of what would be ''reasonable'' under 
both of the Federal methods here applicable, the Utah 
cost-or-value method and the Utah percentage method 
as previously construed. 
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Further, an examination of the statutes and methods 
of other states reveals support for Kennecott's position. 
For example, the following states directly tie their de-
pletion computation to the optional federal methods: 
California-Sec. 8g, Bank & Corporation, Act of 
1945 
Connecticut-Sec. 419c, Supp., Conn. Gen. Sta-
tutes 1930 
Idaho-Sec. 61-2407 (c-1), Idaho Code Ann. 1932 
1\iontana-Sec. 2297 (Third), Mont. Rev. Statutes 
1935 
Oklahoma-Sec. 880 (g), 68 Okla. Statutes 1941 
Oregon-Sec. 110-1508 (g), Oregon Comp. Laws 
Ann. 
Vermont-Sec. 890, Vermont Public Laws 1933 
Three states have accomplished the same result, since 
in Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island the entire 
'law is based upon the federal tax. And the following tie 
in to the federal method by regulation: 
Georgia-'Sec. 92'-3109, Georgia Code 1933 
Kansas-Sec. 79-3206 (11) Gen. Stat. Kans. 1953, 
Reg. 54 
Louisiana-Sec. 8587.9 ( m) La. Gen. :Stat. 1939, 
Reg. 96 
Maryland-Sec. 224(j-1) Ann. Code 1939·, Reg. 4 
Five additional states have delegated plenary regu-
latory powers to the administering agencies: Arizona, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico and North Carolina. 
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Eight appear to tie depletion into cost-or-value alone; 
two apparently do not recognize the depletion deduction; 
and the ren1aining eighteen do not appear to have a com-
parable tax. 
Thus, \Ye submit, we find support in the policies and 
practices of other states to a most substantia1l degree 
that: 
a. The Utah Commission has failed to fol-
low the legislative mandate to allow reasonable 
depletion in this case. 
b. The Utah statutes intend to delegate to 
the Commission wide latitude by regulation ap-
plicable to aH, to invoke any sound method where-
by to compute that reasonable allowance. The 
Commission is not hamstrung between an unrea-
sonable percentage formula, and a difficult single 
alternative. 
c. The method-federal percentage-is rea-
sonable, practical, simple, fair and recognized as 
sound. 
d. In any event, Kennecott shoUld be af-
forded the alternative of utilizing the Utah cost-
or-value method of January 1, 1931. 
Plaintiff suggests that subsections 8 and 9 of Sec. 
80-13-8 are ambiguous and conflicting. Either alone 
would present a clear legislative policy. Together, the 
Commission's view would nullify subsection 8 leaving 9 
a1one. Plantiff's view would give heed to the rule of 
construction "in pari materia'' (50 Am. Jur. 342 et 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
seq., Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 
2d 937.) and find the legislative intent to be to give effect 
to both. That is, the key criterion is a" reasonable allow-
ance'' under subsection 8; but two possible methods are 
then authorized as aids by subsection 9, without restrict-
ing the determination of the allowance to only those 
rnethods and thus preventing the Commission from utili-
zing modern improvements in computation. Either that 
was the legislative intent, or there has been set up a 
peculiar statute with less ~atitude than in practically 
every other state which has considered the problem; and 
as noted, subsection 8 might just as well have been 
omitted. 
3. The Commission has misinterpreted tbe Utah stat-
utes ~establishting tbe percentage formula for determining 
depletion. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the de-
fendant Commission acted within its prerogatives in 
denying plaintiff's request to change over to either the 
Utah value method or the federal percentage method; 
that is, that plaintiff is forced to remain within the per-
centage method straight jacket to which it submitted 
under administrative representations which turned out 
to be illusory. (R. 62) 
We concede that under the New Park decision supra 
federal taxes must first be deducted in determining de-
pletion when this method is invoked. But plaintiff sub-
mits that in making an allocation of the income from the 
property to various steps such as ''mining,'' the Com-
rnission has misconstrued and therefore has violated the 
law. 
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The percentage method statute provides that the 
allowance for depletion shall be one-third of the net in-
come '• from the property.'' Plaintiff contends that all of 
its income from Utah Copper Division is from the prop-
erty: namely, the Bingham Canyon mine. 
This court noted at the end of the New Park decision 
that when § 80-13-8 (9b) qualified the words "net in-
come" with the words "from the property," the legis-· 
lative purpose was to prevent a wasting assets corpora-
tion from taking a deduction for depletion "fron1 all 
income, from whatever source derived.'' It wi'll he noted 
here that Schedules 7 and 12 properly excluded fron1 the 
base to which the percentage was applied all income other 
than from the Bingham Canyon mine. 
a. In the first place, the Commission's contention 
is here directly in the teeth of its own administrative 
interpretation of the Act from 1931 to date. It has never 
heretofore attempted to apply this novel accounting in-
vention either as to Kennecott or any other Utah mine. 
(R. 106) 
As noted on page 6 of the Agreed Record, the Com-
mission's instructions with respect to depletion were not 
amended in this respect until 1943, which for the first 
time brought into the picture the requirement of alloca-
ting income to sources other than ''mineral extraction.'' 
(R. 107) 
b. Further, the federal statute which was originally 
the model for Utah's provisions, ·even as. am-ended to de-
fine and delimit ''from the property," has not been con-
strued to require such an allocation. With respect to the 
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specific Kennecott properties here involved the federal 
counterpart has been given the same construction hereto-
fore applied by the Utah Commission from 1916 to date. 
(11:r. Earl's testimony, R. 68-70.) 
c. Finally, the accounting invention (Ex. 4, R. 226) 
is an admittedly self-proving formula. (R. 91,70) 
'The formula reads as fol1ows: 
D2 + D (2TC + TNI) - TNI. MC = 0 
3 3 
which its inventor, Mr. Allison, on page 91 of the record 
said was a quadratic equation which determined deple-
tion by the particular formula ''because the depletion 
itself allowable under the statute depends upon the 
amount of depletion allowable.'' Mr. Ear1 pointed out 
that "I was taught very early in my mathematics that a 
formula which defined anything in terms of itself should 
not be used. Now, this formula does that very thing***." 
(R. 70) 
It is respectfully submitted that here again is an 
irlustration where the Commission is arrogating unto 
itself the power arbitrarily to create and apply mathema-
tical formulae to the sole end that in the particular case 
a higher tax results. Only the Commission's accountants 
could conceive that when the legislature in plain words 
allowed depletion for the average mine operator, self-
proving quadratic equations were contemplated. 
In considering the words ''gross income from the 
property" as used in the Federal statute, the United 
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SU;ttes Supren1e Court has said that ''the term should 
be taken in its natural sense.'' Further: ''Gross incon1e 
fr?m time to time may be more or less than market value 
according to the bearing of particular contracts. We do 
not think that we are at li.be.rty to construct a the1oretical 
gross income by recourse to the expense of productvon 
operations.'' 
Helvering v. ~fountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 
276, 82 L. ed. 907, 58 S. Ct. 623. 
So here the plain and natural meaning seems to 
treat as the "net income from the property" the mnount 
received from the sales of copper-the taxpayer's first 
marketable product which came from the Utah Copper 
J.Iine. This is what has ·been accepted without question 
by both state and federal taxing agents until the present 
attempt. This is what the legislature of Utah must have 
intended when it enacted the corporation franchis~e tax 
in 1931 as applied to mining operations well known to 
exist here for nearly a century. Certainly if the legisla-
ture had intended to substitute a theoretical income by 
the operator, it would have said so. 
The question may well he asked at what point should 
the cut-off be made in cases such as Kennecott where 
conceivably expansion could continue into fabrication, 
and possibly even branch enterprises for the actual utili-
zation of the product such as for copper roofs in homes. 
These indeed might entail income from activities other 
than "mining" in its "natural sense." We would sub-
mit that the natural cut-off point should he at the end 
of the ~irst normally n?Jarketable product; and indeed 
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this is the rule of Section 114 of the Federal Internal 
Hevenue Code, where by statute Congress amended the 
old la-\v cmnparable to Utah's now to define "gross in-
em up fron1 the property" as follows: 
As used in this paragraph the term ''gross 
income from the property'' means the gross in-
come from mining. The term "mining'' as used 
herein shall be considered to include not merety 
the ·extraction of the ores or minerals from the 
ground but also the ordinary treatment processes 
normally applied by mine owners or operators in 
order to obtain the comercially marketable min-
eral product or products. 
Here as noted, the commerciaHy marketable mineral 
products of Kennecott are sold when first possible in the 
normal course of operation-the copper after it is finally 
produced in marketable form by refining. (R. 102) 
Further, the only Commission rule on this subject 
-in contrast with Federal Statute-is the 1943 change in 
Instruction 21 to read: 
In cases where the taxpayer engaged in ac-
tivities in addition to, or derives income from 
sources other than, mineral extraction, deductions 
not directly attributable to any particular activity 
or source of income sha!ll be fairly allocated. 
As stipulated and undisputed, such profits or income 
attri'hutable to smelting, transportation, refining and 
selling the first marketable product have already been 
exc1uded by payments to the several companies perform-
ing those services. (R. 66-70, 102.) This practice has 
continued since long before Utah had an income tax, but 
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no one until this case had doubted that Kennecott's in-
come from its sales of copper and other mineral products 
when finally sold in marketable form was income from 
its Utah Copper ~line. 
In concluding the argument with respect to the de-
pletion allowance, we summarize : 
The Comn1ission has violated the statutory 1nandate 
which requires the allowance of a reasonable deduction 
for dep1etion under the facts of Kennecott's particular 
operations, because: 
F-irst: a. The Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in summarily refusing Kennecott's request 
to depart from the state percentage method forinula 
which it had originally accepted on the basis of two in-
terpretations no longer existent; the first, the Commis-
sion's attempted change of the statute to base the per-
centage allowance on income from "mineral extraction" 
rather from the wording ''from the property'' ; and the 
second, the unprecedented federal taxes which under this 
court's interpretation must first be deducted before com-
puting depletion. 
h. The Commission should have granted plaintiff's 
request under these circumstances to transfer either to 
the Utah cost-or-value method; or preferably to the 
federa1 percentage method for computing depletion, or 
at least some other method which would have afforded 
a reasonhle allowance under the circumstances of this 
case. 
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Second: In any event, the Commission has acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously and beyond its authority by mis-
construing the law to permit allocating a portion of Ken-
necott's net income from its Utah mining property to 
other processes on the basis of a self-proving formula. 
4. The ·Tax Commission erred in that it has discrim-
inated against this taxpay,er and is attempting to take its 
property without due process of law in v\iolation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and 
Sections 7 and 24, Article I, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
This point is directed to the action taken by the 
Cmnmission outlined heretofore insofar as such action 
violates plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff with 
all others is to be afforded the equal protection of Utah's 
laws without discrimination and in accordance with those 
laws, under the well-known provisions of the state and 
federal Constitutions above set forth. 
a. But here, of all corporations engaged in business 
in several states including Utah, Kennecott is to be sad-
dled with the Commission's specia1 rules for allocating 
income to this state for tax purposes. The record is silent 
as to the basis for such special treatment unless it is that 
the tax burden will be greater to the taxpayer. 
b. And too, ~plaintiff alone is to be given the benefit 
of Exhibit 4~the self-proving quadratic equation-even 
though the result, as Inventor Allison candidly admitted, 
may or may not have any relationship to a" reasonable" 
allowance for depletion. (R. 92) No attempt-at least as 
of this date-has been made by the defendant to allocate 
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for depletion purposes any other mine's income ''from· 
the property'' to such post-mine processes. (R. 106) 
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the tax 
base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the F,ederal 'GoV1ermnent. 
During 19-!2 the Federal Governn1ent paid to Kenne-
eott stipulated stuns in connection with its Utah opera-
tions as subsidies under the authority of 50 U. S. C. A. 
App. 901-2. The Commission has included these amounts 
as part of Kennecott's "gross income" for Utah Corp-
oration Franchise Tax purposes. (R. 112; Stip. par. VI.) 
Plaintiff concedes that Utah's corporation franchise 
tax statutes are broad enough to include such subsidies 
as "gross ineome," in contrast with the more limited 
provisions of other Utah Tax statutes. 
Overruling the United States District Court, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Federal 
Government did not intend to exclude these subsidies 
from this type of state taxation. (Kennecott Copper 
Corporation et al. v. Sa:lt Lake County, 163 F. 2d 484.) 
Admittedly it will therefore be difficult for this court to 
do anything other than to follow the Circuit Court. Thus 
while plaintiff submits the opinion of the Circuit Court 
is erroneous, extended argument now, except to preserve 
the point, would seem to serve no useful purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, § 80-13-47 provides that there shall be 
a plenary review by this court of the Commission's 
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actions based upon the record below, in effect as woUld be 
in an equity case. 
A judge trying such a cause would of course have to 
make findings supported by competent evidence. ( § 104-
26-2, 3) No jury would be permitted to ignore or disre-
gard without cause competent and material evidence; 
(Leavitt v. Thurston, 33 U. 135, 143 P. 140; Karren v. 
Bair, U. 334, 225 P. 1094); and the action of administra-
tive tribunals must be consistent with, and even discre-
tion must be exercised ''in accordance with established 
principles of justice and not arbitrarily or capricious~y, 
fraudulently, and without factual basis." ( 42 Am. Jur. 
380, Sec. 69.) 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based on the rec-
ord below and in accordance with these principles, the de-
cision of the defendant State Tax Commission should be 
set aside and the cause remanded with the following 
directions : 
1. That plaintiff's amended return, filed in accord-
ance with § 80-13-21, should be treated as the basis for 
computing the corporation franchise tax subject of course 
to the usual' administrative review of its contents. 
2. That the~e should 'be excluded from gross income 
the federal subsidies paid to Kennecott. 
3. That in computing the required reasonable al-
lowance for depletion: 
a. The Commission under Utah's law may give 
consideration to the advisabi'lity of permitting plaintiff 
and all other mine operators to invoke the federal per-
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centage method for determining a ''reasonable allow-
ance," subject to the Commission's rules and regulations. 
b. In the alternative, the plaintiff be afforded an 
election between the Utah percentage method (§ 80-13-
8 (9b) ) as construed by this court in New Park Mining 
Co. et al v. State Tax Commission, and the cost-or-value 
method of§ 80-13-8 (9a). 
c. That the Utah percentage Inethod as applied to 
both Kennecott and other mine operators is to be con-
strued to require as ''net income from the property'' the 
inclusion of the net amounts actually received froin the 
operator frmn the sale of the mine products in their 
first nonnally 1narketable form, excluding income from 
sources other than those connected in the full and natural 
sense with the mining venture. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. :M. M:cCR.EA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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